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M'NAGHTEN AND THE WITCH-DOCTOR:
PSYCHIATRY AND CRIME IN AFRICA *
ALAN MmIN_ t
It is easy to understand why psychiatry was a relative latecomer
to the medical scene in sub-Saharan Africa. The emphasis of colonial
medical services was naturally and properly on providing the qualified
personnel and facilities to fight tropical disease, reduce needless mortal-
ity and increase life expectancy. For many decades now, resources
have been expended on basic remedial work, so much so, in fact, that
even adequate preventative programs have had to await the prior
provision of doctors, hospitals, nurses and medical supplies; public
health specialists are still in short supply. And if the sheer size of
the problems-in terms of the numbers of patients, the difficulties of
travel and the diversity of language-were not enough, they have been
multiplied by the resistance to change produced by superstition and
ignorance.'
It must be remembered that throughout the colonial period even in
Europe psychiatry was only slowly feeling its way forward toward
acceptance. Basic ideas of the discipline were still evolving; facilities
and personnel were only gradually becoming available as the barriers of
European superstition and ignorance began to break down. With
psychiatrists in short supply in Europe, few could be made available
for service in the colonies. In addition, there was a tendency-some-
times articulated but often not-toward assuming that mental disorder
was more the problem of the economically advanced, urbanized and
overtly stressful nations. By contrast, the life situation of the less
"inhibited" African was seen as not so fraught with possibilities of
disturbance. Only the manifestly deranged needed isolation when
they created a public nuisance; for the rest, the extended family was
frequently seen to act as a general social welfare agency.
* This is a modified version of a chapter of AI"cAN PE'AL SYSTEMS (Milner
ed.), to be published by Routledge & Kegan Paul (London) in 1967.
t LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D., of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Fellow of Trinity Col-
lege, Oxford. Bicentennial Fellow in Criminal Law and its Administration, University
of Pennsylvania, 1965-66. Formerly Professor of Law and Dean of the Faculty of
Law, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Northern Nigeria.
I For a modern synopsis of problems and progress, see 2 KImBLE, TROPICAL
AmIucA 159-82 (1960). It must be remembered, of course, that not all superstition
impeded the development of modem medical facilities. See, e.g., Ajose, Preventive
Medicine and Superstition in Nigeria, 27 AIR. 268 (1957).
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1. MODERN PSYCHIATRY IN AFRICA
In consequence, the psychiatric facilities of Africa today are not
impressive. A survey south of the Sahara (excluding the Republic
of South Africa 2) in 1963 ' revealed that some countries, such as
Bechuanaland, Swaziland and the Gambia, had no psychiatrists at all.
Cameroun, Gabon, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), the Niger Republic
and Sierra Leone each had one psychiatrist, but they were not in-
digenous. Zambia and Tanzania each had two expatriate psychiatrists;
Kenya had three expatriates. Senegal had one indigenous and three
expatriates; Nigeria had the largest number-ten, only three of whom
were from overseas.
4
Realization of the lack of trained personnel is crucial to the under-
standing of the problems facing psychiatry in Africa. As with the
general practitioner, the scale of the problems confronting the psychi-
atrist as the tropical countries of Africa began to be developed was
such that his time was wholly taken up with his clinical and adminis-
trative work. The systematization of the basic groundwork of knowl-
edge therefore suffered so that crucial basic work was perforce
neglected. To this day, satisfactory studies of most areas of normal
psychology are lacking; the impact of nursing, weaning and later
child-rearing practices on developmental psychology is largely un-
explored;' and the entire family situation in polygamous and masculine-
dominated communities remains unexamined by comprehensive study
as a factor in personality development.
The psychotherapeutic effectiveness of traditional measures taken
by native healers has still to be properly assessed. Mental illnesses are
often recognized as such in the customary African community and
variously treated by the local equivalents of suggestions, manipulation
of the environment, abreaction and group therapy.' The recognition
2 In South Africa there are 12 mental hospitals and 80 psychiatrists. The facilities
are available at the rates of 3 beds per 1000 whites and 1 bed per 1000 non-whites.
All the psychiatrists are white. See Walton, Psychiatric Practice in a Multiracial
Society, 3 Coup. PsyCH. 255 (1962).
3 1 am indebted to Dr. Tolani Asuni of Aro Hospital, Abeokuta, Nigeria, for
this information and for his helpful comments on this section of the article.
4 The division into indigenous and expatriate is not fanciful. Quite apart from
problems of language, it may well be that social stresses in any given culture may
make interracial communication more difficult in the doctor-patient relationship. See,
e.g., Walton, supra note 2. Dawson, Urbanization and Mental Health in a West
African Community, in MAGIC, FAITH AND HEALING 305 (Kiev ed. 1965), reports
that in Sierra Leone patients are often removed from the mental hospital and taken
to traditional healers "that have complete understanding of the social complications
involved."
5 But see Albino & Thompson, The Effects of Sudden Weaning on Zulu Children,
29 Br. J. MED. PsycH. 177 (1956).
G These are dealt with in detail in the Yoruba context in Prince, Indigenms
Yoruba Psychiatry, in MAGIC, FAITH AND HFALI NG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 84. See
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and use of these culturally oriented agencies as part of the mental health
programs of developing countries in Africa has actually taken place
in Nigeria 7 and has been urged elsewhere.8  But whatever empirical
studies have been undertaken, it is too extravagant to say, as one com-
mentator has, that the traditional measures "are as effective and as
scientifically sound as any . . practised in Europe." '
Against this background of lack of scientific information, it is
easy for the transient observer to give a generalized and wholly mis-
leading-often an unfortunately ethnocentrically prejudiced-picture
of African psychology and psychiatry. It is not many years ago, for
example, that the psychiatric world was reliably informed that "normal
African mentality closely resembles the mentality of a section of the
European population which is entitled psychopathic or sociopathic,"
and that "for the most part Bantu Africans are very happy-go-lucky
and inaggressive and would fall into the category of psychopaths called
'inadequate.' " " By the same token, incidence studies, both in general
terms and in relation to specific psychiatric categories, have been
shallow and misleading. Depressive illnesses have been said to be
rare, neurotic conditions seldom encountered and psychosomatic dis-
orders typically non-African.
It is now clear that many of these misconceptions about African
mental illness are the result of too hasty a survey of the local scene
and too uncritical an application of psychiatric concepts across cultural
boundaries. Psychiatric workers now accept that
Both anthropologists and psychiatrists face the astonishingly
difficult task of evaluating behavior in terms of a series of
factors, including its relation to accepted norms of behavior
for a given culture and the adequacy of behavior in its social
setting. A principal danger comes from mistaking the
also FInLD, THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY passinm (1960) ; Gelfand, Psychiatric Disorders
as Recognized by the Shona, in MAGIC, FAITH AND HEALING, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 156; Messing, Group Therapy and Social Status in the Zar Cult of Ethiopia,
in CULTURE AND MENTAL HEALTH 319 (Opler ed. 1959); An Ndembu Doctor in
Practice, in MAGIC, FAITH AND HEALING, op. cit. supra note 4, at 230.
7 See Lambo Neuropsychiatric Observations in the Western Region of Nigeria,
1956 BRIi. Mm. Y. 1388; Lambo, Patterns of Psychiatric Care in Developing African
Countries, in MAGIC, FAITH AND HEALING, op. cit. supra note 4, at 443, 447-51; Randal,
Witch Doctors and Psychiatry, Harpers, Dec. 1965, p. 56.
Sjahoda, Traditional Healers and Other Institutions Concerned With Mental
Illness in Ghana, 7 IIIT'L J. Soc. PsYcH. 245 (1961). The integration proposal is
contained in most of the contributions to MAGIC, FAITH AND HEALING, op. cit. supra
note 4. Opposition to integration appears to be based on a rigid commitment to
Western psychiatry and an over-simplification of the problem of supply and demand
in Africa. See Margetts, The Future of Psychiatry in East Africa, 37 E. AFr. ME. J.
448 (1960).
9 Lambo, supra note 7, at 1389.
10 Carothers, Frontal Lobe Function of the African, 97 J. MENT. ScI. 112 (1951).
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culturally defined norms of behavior in Western culture to
be ideal standards. 1
The recognition of symptoms and the diagnosis of illness will therefore
depend not only upon the psychiatrist's ability to overcome the lan-
guage barrier but even more so on his ability to understand the cultural
background in which he is working. The interpretation of behavior or
the identification of delusions, for instance, will be impossible unless
he has some familiarity with cultural norms and is able to take them
into proper account when reaching his conclusions. Such matters as
local peculiarities of family patterns, cultural conceptions of causation 2
and the widespread but varying beliefs in the immediate physical and
mental consequences of supernatural action, will form an essential back-
ground to the understanding of abnormality. And even then, a
psychiatrist working within a culture which is his own may experience
difficulty in delineating confidently where normal cultural beliefs cease
and mental illness begins. 3
With caution, however, one may say that the patterns of psychi-
atric disorder among Africans are closely akin to the known patterns
already familiar in Euro-American cultures. There are, of course,
demonstrated qualitative differences, but, despite doubts which have
been expressed,"4 it seems that in most cases these are susceptible to
interpretation within the framework of the socio-cultural setting.
Schizophrenia, for instance, particularly in its simple and hebephrenic
forms, is commonly reported as the most prevalent psychosis. 5 Epi-
sodic confusion and hysteria-like symptoms characterize the illness to
a greater extent than in Europe and, although the manic picture is
easily recognized by its exhilaration of mood and thought, the de-
pressive syndrome is less frequently manifested and more difficult to
11 Wittkower & Fried, The Problems of Transcultural Psychiatry, in CULTRE
AND MENTAL HEALTH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 492. Cf. LEIGHTON, LAmBo & OTHERS,
PsYcHiARIc DIsoRDER AMONG THE YORUBA (1963) (see especially ch. VI, "The
Problem of Cultural Distinction").
n In particular, idea systems which rely heavily on belief in supernatural causation
have profound implications for analysis, diagnosis and treatment. LEIGHTON, LAmmo
& OmTRs, op. cit. sitpra note 11, at 113-14, report that the Yoruba ascribe causative
power in mental illness to such factors as malignant influences-superhuman and
human, drugs and medicines, heredity, contagion, fate, violation of one's own destiny,
cosmic forces and physical or psychological traumata.
13 E.g., Lambb, The Role of Cultural Factors in Paranoid Psychosis Among the
Yoruba Tribe, 101 J. MENT. ScI. 239, 247 (1955) (speaking of the differentiation
between normal cultural beliefs in supernatural powers and paranoid psychosis).
14 See, e.g., TOOTH, STUDIEs IN MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE GoI COAST 41 (1950).
1' See CAROrHERS, THE AFRICAN MIND IN H-EALTH AND DISEASE 139 (1955),
and studies cited therein; Benedict & Jacke, Mental Illness in Primitive Societies,
17 PsycH. 377 (1954); Lambo, Further Neuropsychiatric Observations in Nigeria,
1960 BRIT. MED. J. 1696-97 (noting no predominance of any subvariety); Loudon,
Psychogenic Disorder and Social Conflict Among the Zulu, in CULTUr' AND MENTAL
HEALTH, op. cit. suipra note 6, at 363; Walton, supra note 2, at 262.
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identify by mood criteria alone. Organically-based or predisposed con-
ditions are regularly found, associated with trypanosomiasis, malaria,
venereal infection and nutritional deficiencies.' 6 It has generally been
found that neurotic conditions are more likely to take culturally
tolerable forms in African contexts and therefore less frequently find
their way to mental hospitals." It is equally clear, nonetheless, that
strong cultural emphasis on sexual potency in the male and fertility in
the female and intensive belief in witchcraft and supernatural powers
are powerful anxiety-inducing agents. As the scope of psychiatric
investigation has widened to surveying hospital out-patients, as well
as those attending native healers and shrines, a greater range of
neurosis has been disclosed.'" In the whole range of clinical reports
from African countries, only one distinctively African syndrome has
been noted which it is claimed cannot be understood in terms of
traditional diagnostic categories; and it is still uncertain how far this
can be regarded as a separate disease entity.'
9
It is important to stress again that it is only with the more careful
modem studies that the above picture of the incidence of African
mental illness has been built up. Past studies had concentrated their
attention too narrowly on mental institutions. In developed countries
this would be misleading enough; in Africa it proved to be infinitely
worse. The solitary mental hospitals have all too often become havens
for "criminal lunatics, homicidal lunatics and lunatics without known
domicile," as one older study expressed it,20 and even today one of
their primary functions is not so much the treatment of the ill as the
protection of the public from the dangerous.21  With the present dif-
ferential in cultural development within African countries, it has be-
come clear as well that urban areas present atypical samples of mental
16CARoTHERs, op. cit. supra note 15, ch. 9; Loudon, supra note 15, at 363;
Wittkower & Fried, supra note 11, at 493.
17 CAROTHERS, op. cit. supra note 15, at 148-52; Loudon, supra note 15, at 364-65.
ISLambo, supra note 15, at 1700-02 (out-patients and patients at native treat-
ment centers); Walton, supra note 2, at 262 (out-patients). FIELD, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 149, reported that depression was the most common mental illness encountered
among rural Akan (Ghana) women "and nearly all such patients come to the shrines
with spontaneous self-accusations of witchcraft."
19 See Lamnbo, Malignant Anxiety: A Syndrome Associated With Criminal Con-
duct in Africans, 108 J. MENT. ScL 256 (1962). One suspects that like the "frenzied
anxiety" reported by CAROTHERS, op. cit. supra note 15, Lambo's "malignant anxiety"
is only of pathoplastic significance in schizophrenia and not a disease sui generis.
20 See Shelley & Watson, An Investigation Concerning Mental Disorder in the
Nyasaland Native, 82 J. MENT. Sci. 701, 703 (1936) (a study of the Central Lunatic
Asylum, Zomba, Nyasaland (now Malawi)).
21 Cf. TooTH, op. cit. supra note 14, at 24 (discussing the Colonial Mental Hospital,
Accra, Gold Coast (now Ghana)) ; Dawson, supra note 4 (discussing Kissy Mental
Hospital, Sierra Leone). It is interesting to note that in South Africa, where the
psychiatric facilities for non-whites are limited, see note 2 supra, the rate of admission
of non-whites to mental hospitals following criminal charges is extremely high. The
remaining non-white admissions were all classified as emergencies. See Walton,
supra note 2, especially Table 2.
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illness. As Field reported following her work in rural areas of
Southern Ghana:
A depressed patient is not considered mentally ill, for she is
correctly orientated, accessible, and says nothing which is-
in the ideological setting-irrational. . . . The depressive
personality is, in sickness and health, self-effacing and is
seldom a disturbing nuisance. She is therefore the last type
of patient who would ever find her way to any kind of
European hospital unless she had some concurrent and con-
spicuous trouble. . . . It is not surprising therefore that
psychiatrists and other doctors who see patients only in hos-
pitals and clinics should have the idea that depression in
Africans hardly exists.2
Potentially one of the most powerful forces affecting the incidence
of mental illness in African countries today is the rapid rate of cultural
change. It has long been pointed out that
mental health problems grow in direct relation to the dis-
turbing of traditional bonds that hold families and com-
munities together. It is suggested that individuals socialized
under such well-knit' family conditions may suffer when they
are estranged from traditional systems of security arrange-
ments previously rooted in the family.3
It is only fair to say that much of the evidence to support this statement
is of necessity highly impressionistic. Few field workers have been
able to deal with the problem in depth with adequate clinical and
psychological facilities or with precise controls.
Tooth was able to discern in Ghana no apparent statistical rela-
tionship between psychosis and Europeanization, taking literacy as the
criterion of the latter. 4  Carothers' inquiries were no more conclusive 5
Lambo observed that both the prevalence and symptom pattern of dis-
orders differed as between literate and nonliterate groups.2 6 In Algeria,
DeVos and Miner reported evidence from Rorschach protocols that
"attenuation of traditional beliefs in the urbanized Arab is related to
increasing intro-psychic tensions," though by adhering to traditional
social and religious beliefs they were not forced into patterns of
dramatic cultural adaptation.
7
2 2
FIuT, op. cil. supra note 6, at 149.
23Wittkower & Fried, supra note 11, at 495.
24 TOOTH, op. cit. supra note 14, at 61-62. He also noted, however, that delusional
content in psychosis was determined by cultural factors and that the content in the
cases of literate psychotics therefore differed from that of the illiterate. Id. at 52.
Cf. Wittkower & Fried, supra note 11.
25 CARioTHERS, op. cit. supra note 15, at 130-33.
26 Lambo, supra note 13, at 247.2 7 DeVos & Miner, Oasis and Casbah-A Study in Acculturative Stress, in CuL-
TURE AND MENTAL HEALTH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 345.
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The most significant study in this area is that undertaken by the
Cornell-Aro Mental Health Research Project in Western Nigeria.28
Based on a primary group of twenty-five villages in the same area and
eight parts of a town, it was possible to obtain an appreciable range
with regard to size of community, traditional patterns, modernization
and degree of socio-cultural integration. Taking such factors as
poverty, ineffective leadership, broken homes and breakdown in lineage
solidarity as indicative of community disintegration, it was discovered
that one and a half times as many people in the disintegrated villages
as in integrated places (22% : 14%) were potential psychiatric
"cases." Less than half as many (18%' : 42%) were "well." The
relationship was particularly pronounced for women. In the integrated
places there were ten times as many rated "well" as were rated "cases"
(60% : 6%), while in the disintegrated villages there were one and
a half times as many women who were "cases" as were "well"
(26% : 15%). Socio-cultural disintegration certainly appears from
this study to be directly associated with psychiatric disorder, though
is was not indicated whether it preceded or followed it. The assump-
tion must be the latter. At the same time, the role and effects of
simple cultural change remain unexplored in detail, though it may
perhaps be assumed with some confidence that the rapid cultural changes
being experienced in the economic and political development of modern
Africa will continue to bring socio-cultural disintegration in their train
and thereby predispose to psychiatric disorder those who are enveloped
in the changes.
II. PSYCHIATRY AND THE PENAL SYSTEM
Very few African penal institutions, if any at all, are fortunate
enough to have full-time medical officers, as basic medical facilities are
so poor in the general community. It can easily be assumed that the
psychiatric situation is much worse. Although there is good reason
for supposing that a greater proportion of deviant and defective
personalities will be found in the prison community than in the popu-
lation at large, there are hardly any specialized prison psychiatric
services in the continent.
The absence of these facilities, coupled with the usual lack of
development of the general psychiatric facilities in any given com-
munity, has two important consequences. First, the residential treat-
ment facilities which generally are available in the community-
be they in the form of a mental hospital (normally only one) or asylums
(normally several)-will be undifferentiating in their reception of
28Published as LEIGHTON, LA3O'.& OTHERS, op. Cit. supra note 11.
PSYCHIATRY AND CRIME IN AFRICA
patients. Civil committals, both voluntary and on certification, will
be accommodated side by side with criminal committals, and the less
seriously disturbed together with the chronically or acutely disturbed.
The same strict security measures will be taken in respect of all
patients, and each will receive as much, or as little, treatment as any
other, irrespective of his condition. Occasionally, some countries do
not allow the mixing of civil and criminal patients, applying security
measures only to the criminal classification; they may be kept in indi-
vidual cells or a few in a cell, as in Gabon, or isolated on an island,
as on Fotoba Island in the Republic of Guinea.
Secondly, even though facilities may be labelled "criminal" and
"non-criminal," such is the general lack of development of both that
the distinction may not easily be recognized. Given that the capacity
of properly equipped mental hospitals, where they exist, is strictly
limited, the criminal defendant who is found to be irresponsible or
unfit to stand trial may find himself committed either to prison or to
an asylum physically adjacent to and under common supervision with
it." Once there, occasional sedation may be the extent of the treatment
received, and sometimes even this may be more than can be expected.
Enahoro's grisly picture of the conditions of "lunatics" in prison in
Nigeria twenty years ago may not be far from the truth in many
parts of Africa today:
I saw more brutality to those unfortunate wretches in one
year than I have seen in all the rest of my life. Considered
fair game for baton practice by any warder, they slept on
bare floors, often denied blankets, their meals were irregular,
they were frequently refused buckets for their natural needs,
and some of them might never step out of their cells for
weeks. . . . No one seemed to care, except on the rare occa-
sions of the Visiting Committee's inspections when, after a
general cleaning, the normal odour was masked by bucketfuls
of disinfectant."
29 Procedural legislation frequently provides for committal to "a mental hospital,
prison or other suitable place of safe custody . . . ." LAWS OF SIERRA LEONE C. 39,
§ 64(4) (1960). Cf. GHANA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE § 133(5) (1960); Nigeria
Criminal Procedure Act, § 222 (1963); LAWS OF UGANDA C. 24, § 162(5) (1951);
LAWS OF ZANZIBAR C. 14, § 156(5) (1961). Where the medical facilities are inade-
quate, the legislation may simply call for committal to prison. E.g., LAWS OF BECHU-
ANALAND C. 18, §§ 169(1), (2) (1959). The order made by the Nyasaland High
Court in Regina v. Alidia, [1959] 1 Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 221, 224, is typical:
It is hereby ordered that the Accused person be kept in custody as a criminal
lunatic in the Mental Hospital at Zomba, or if suitable accommodation is not
available at the Mental Hospital at Zomba, then in the Central Prison at
Zomba, until such time as the wishes of the Governor are made known.
3 0
ENAHORO, FUGITIVE OFFENDER 92-93 (1965). The use of chains and other
restraints, frequently without reason and without the keeping of proper records, was
the subject of official report in Nigeria at this time. See PATERSON, A REPORT TO
His ExcELLENcY THE GOVERNOR OF NIGERIA ON CRIME AND ITS TREATMENT IN THE
COLONY AND PROTCTOATE 1 12 (1944).
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If the "lunatic" is incapacitated, he may be found sitting under a
convenient shade tree in the prison yard; if he is violent, he may be
chained." Provision for the transfer to a hospital of prisoners who are
in need of treatment exists in all prisons legislation, but for obvious
reasons the procedure is not extensively used. 2
In the former British colonies, the utter inadequacy and in-
humanity of this situation has constantly been reiterated.3 But only
slowly, as other facilities have become available, have the mentally
ill been moved out of the prison systems. In Nigeria, generally re-
garded as having better facilities than most independent African
countries, prison reports from 1950 to 1960 show that at the end
of each year there were more than four hundred mentally abnormal
prisoners in the population of the federal prison system alone (that is,
not including the local authority systems in Western and Northern
Nigeria). On the average, two hundred fifty of this number each
year were civilly committed.3
The situation is distressing enough on its own account. It is
perhaps more distressing when considered together with its implica-
tions for the legal adjudication of responsibility. To this problem we
now turn.
III. PSYCHIATRY AND THE COURTS
How far psychiatric experience can be utilized by the courts will
obviously be governed by the availability of the facilities already dis-
cussed. Provisions referring to its use-in pre-trial examinations, in
trial determinations of responsibility and in various post-sentence pro-
cedures-are not designed to reflect the regular availability of medical
or psychiatric services in Africa but rather to give official idealized
recognition to their role and to lay the groundwork of machinery
which would become more a reality in the future.
3 1 The barbarism is not necessarily colonially inspired. Prince has pointed out
that traditional healers frequently resort to chaining their patients to prevent injury.
Prince, .mpra note 6, at 117.
n E.g., Kenya Prisons Ordinance, § 39 (1963); LIBERIAN CODE OF LAws c. 8,
§ 737 (1956) ; Nigeria Prisons Act, §§ 19, 21 (1960); Rhodesia & Nyasaland Prisons
Act, §§ 72, 73 (1955) (now in force in Southern Rhodesia and Malawi); Mental
Disorders Act, Act No. 38 of 1916, § 40 (So. Afr.); Zambia Prisons Act, §§ 70-71
(1965). LAws OF UGANDA C. 59, § 58 (1951), provides that persons of unsound mind
shall only be kept in prison long enough to effect certification, then transferred to a
mental hospital.
33 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS IN THE COLONIES,
MEMORANDUM ON THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS f149 (1954). The recommendations
of the Colonial Secretary's Consultant Psychiatrist for the reorganization of the
Nigerian system are referred to in that country's ANNUAL REPORT ON THE TREATMENT
OF OFFENDERS (1956-57). Not a great deal has since been done to implement them.
34 The 1960-61 Report (made during the first year of independence) is the last
to be published. ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE FEDERAL PRISONS DEPARTMENT (1958-61);
ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS (1950-57).
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The realities of medical practice at the present time are such that
the minute number of psychiatrists, burdened with heavy hospital and
administrative duties, cannot give much of their time to forensic
psychiatry no matter how anxious they may be to do so. In general,
where there are psychiatrists in an African country, they provide
services only for the courts in the immediate vicinity, usually only in
criminal cases, seldom in noncapital or at least nonviolent cases and
irregularly with respect to capital crimes and offenses of serious
violence. It is probably true that a psychiatric opinion can be obtained
in the majority of capital cases-usually murder cases -5in which it
is requested, though sometimes the sheer physical difficulties involved
in getting to see patients make it impracticable. 6 And usually, of
course, no more than one expert opinion will be available, making the
conflict between expert witnesses in psychiatric matters an uncommon
experience in African courts.
A. The Accused's Fitness To Make His Defense
If an accused person is not so manifestly deranged that he is
removed to safe custody before his trial, the first occasion on which
his sanity will come under consideration will be when he is brought
to trial. At that stage, the issue will not be whether he was of un-
sound mind at the time of the offense, or even whether he is now of
unsound mind, but rather whether he is fit to stand trial. No psychiatric
standard is set here; the anglophonic African jurisdictions have
followed the English pattern and established simple functional tests
which can be applied by the courts without expert assistance.
An accused person is unfit to be tried if he cannot understand
the charge against him, cannot follow or appreciate the proceedings
in court or cannot instruct his advisers so that his defense may properly
be prepared." Incapacity in any one of these respects will render him
unfit to be tried and the mere fact that in lucid moments he appreciates
what is being said against him will not make him fit."8 Similarly, if
the accused satisfies all three tests but cannot make a positive defense
35 The death penalty is commonly mandatory for murder. See p. 1165 infra. One
consequence of this is that defendants are commonly advised to plead insanity only
in defense to murder charges; in other cases, ordinary imprisonment or any lesser
sentence may well be preferable to inadequate and indefinite treatment for mental
illness.
361 personally know of the refusal of an African psychiatrist's request to see
all charged murderers, on the grounds that distances were too great and security
arrangements too tenuous. A judge warned the same psychiatrist that he would kill
himself with work if he tried to carry out any such project.
37 Regina v. Podola, [1960] 1 Q.B. 325; Kaplotwa s/o Tarino v. Regina, [1957]
E. Afr. L.R. 553 (Kenya); Regina v. Mudia, [1954] No. Rhod. L.R. 302.
38 Kaplotwa s/o Tarino v. Regina, mipra note 37.
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for some other reason-for example, amnesia caused by supervening
psychosis " or head injury 4 -he will not be deemed unfit for trial.
There are no African Briggs Laws and few mandatory procedures
for calling medical evidence in any type of case. Most of the provisions
simply instruct the courts to inquire into the accused's fitness without
specifying how it shall be done 4 but it is common practice to fulfill
the obligation by remanding for medical observation and report.'
Ghana ' and Nigeria44 both have made medical evidence a pre-
requisite for a finding of unfitness-one assumes that this will be
psychiatric evidence only in a small proportion of cases-but elsewhere
there is no obligation to call such evidence even if it is available.4 The
courts, too, have not been slow to emphasize that the question of
fitness should not be determined solely on the basis of expert evidence
when it is called.4 Experience suggests that in this context there is
considerable likelihood that psychiatric evidence will assume a minor
role at the side of the court's power to ask questions of the accused,
hear his answers and observe his demeanor.
A finding of unfitness to be tried results in the suspension of fur-
ther proceedings and either the detention of the accused 47 or in some
countries his conditional release if the offense charged is bailable and
he is not dangerous and can safely be given into the custody of relatives
or friends.4" When he is reported to be recovered the trial may be
s9 Regina v. Njiri, [1959] 2 Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 241 (So. Rhod.).
4o Regina v. Phiri, [1958] Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 1008 (No. Rhod.).
41 LAWS OF SIERRA LEONE C. 39, § 64(l) (1960) ; LAWS OF UGANDA C. 24, § 162(1)
(1951) ; LAWS OF ZANZIBAR C. 14, § 156(l) (1961).
42 See, e.g., Regina v. Nyasulu, [1956] Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 633 (Nyas.), setting
out the practice for that country.
43 GHANA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE § 133(1) (1960).
4 4 Nigeria Criminal Procedure Act, § 223(3) (1963); NORTHERN NIGERIA CRImI-
xAL PROCEDURE CODE § 320(3) (1963).
45 Singh s/o Singh v. Regina, [1958] E. Afr. L.R. 28 (Kenya). If the defense
fails to call such evidence, knowing that it is available, it will not then be allowed
to claim that there was insufficient inquiry into the accused's mental condition. The
position in Liberia is uncertain; it appears that in theory there must be medical
evidence before a finding of mental illness for any purpose. See p. 1157 infra.
4s See, e.g., The Queen v. Madugba, 3 Fed. Sup. Ct. 1 (Nig. 1958); Regina v.
Mandala, [1957] Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 251 (Nyas.).
47 For the place of detention, see note 29 supra.
4 8 E.g., GHANA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE § 133(3) (1960); Nigeria Criminal
Procedure Act, § 225(1) (1963) ; NORTHERN NIGERIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
§ 322 (1963) ; LAWS o SIERRA LEONE c. 39, § 64(3) (1960) ; Mental Disorders Act,
Act No. 38 of 1916, § 40 (So. Afr.); LAWS OF UGANDA c. 24, § 162(3) (1951);
LAWS OF ZANZIBAR c. 14, § 156(3) (1961). The statement in Rex v. Sepetsi, [1927]
So. Afr. L.R., O.P.D. 312, that a finding of mental disorder under § 28 of the Mental
Disorders Act absolves the accused from all further proceedings, appears to be based
on the misinterpretation of the section, which applies to those initially unfit to stand
trial and not to those raising insanity as a substantive defense. Section 36 allows the
resumption of the trial following recovery.
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resumed, and though in practice the normal delay will be several months,
it is clear from the reported authorities that the length of permissible
delay cannot be the subject of complete generalization.49
Several countries have been troubled by the proper disposition of
cases involving the deaf mute. The complicating factors peculiar to
Africa are, once again, the shortage of psychiatric facilities to assist
diagnosis-particularly valuable where the disability has existed since
birth, the considerable likelihood that the accused will be illiterate and
therefore unable to respond to written information and questioning and
his frequent isolation from his family or friends who will have estab-
lished means of communicating with him. It is clear that if contact
and comprehension can be established at all, the courts have a duty to
inquire fully into the ways in which these can be accomplished,50 and,
if accomplished, to proceed with the trial if the criteria for fitness to
plead are satisfied. What will happen if the accused cannot be tried
will depend on the jurisdiction.
The English-inspired criminal procedure codes are often of little
specific help, since the English precedents provided only for the dis-
position of the mentally disturbed offender whose fitness to plead was
questioned. The English courts were therefore forced into the bizarre
position of classifying the deaf mute as mentally disordered. 51 The
South African Criminal Procedure Act and its variants in the other
countries of Southern Africa have adopted the same format.52 Ex-
tensive criticism,5 3 however, has led the courts of Southern Rhodesia
to the point of refusing to commit an apparently sane person to
psychiatric custody. 4 The current South African solution appears to
49 E.g., Sudan Gov't v. Khalid, [1962] Sudan LJ.R. 115 (23/2 years).
50 The duty and the procedure to be followed in fulfilling it are set out in Leseroi
v. Regina, [1964] E. Afr. L.R. 111 (1963) (Kenya); Rex v. Katete, 6 Uganda L.R.
200 (1948).
51Rex v. Governor, [1909] 2 K.B. 81, on the interpretation of the Criminal
Lunatics Act, 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 94, § 2; cf. ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING,
PRAcriCE AND EvIDENcE §§ 464-65 (35th ed. 1962). Modern legislative reform does
not appear to have changed the position for the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act,
1964, although referring to the case of an accused under a "disability" preventing
trial, §4(1), then provides in §5(1) that the court shall order such a person to be
"admitted to such hospital as may be specified by the Secretary of State." Dis-
charge will then be in the discretion of the Secretary of State.
52 LAWs OF BECHUANALAND C. 18, §§ 163, 169 (1959); South Africa Criminal
Procedure Act, § 164 (1957) ; Mental Disorders Act, Act No. 38 of 1916, § 28 (So.
Afr.) ; Southern Rhodesia Mental Disorders Act, 1936, § 30; Rex v. Mamyila, [1913]
So. Afr. L.R., T.P.D. 464.
53 E.g., 1 GARDINER & LANSDOWNE, SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
cDmua 91-92 (6th ed. 1957) ; see notes 54 & 55 infra.
44 In re Pupu, [1959] 1 Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 377 (So. Rhod.). The Attorney
General finally did not oppose the discharge from mental hospital, committal to prison
and later discharge. It does not appear that the trial judge's call for amending legis-
lation has yet been acted upon.
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be to hold that their legislation gives them sufficient leeway to commit
such a person to prison pending the President's instructions."
The codes which follow the early Colonial Office pattern 6 either
provide specifically for the sane but unfit accused to "be treated in like
manner as a person incapable of making his defence by reason of un-
soundness of mind" or allow him to be treated in this way in default
of specific provision. These codes obviate, however, the difficulties
of the situation by providing for his discharge to the custody of friends
or relatives if he can properly be cared for and is not dangerous to
himself or others.
Only the East African countries have legislated a special pro-
cedure for this type of case. Provided that there is a finding that the
accused committed the act alleged, he will be detained in prison pending
a further order.57 This power appears to be used sympathetically, in
an attempt to handle the social situation in its entirety, so far as it is
possible to do so with limited resources. It has been used, for instance,
to insure the safe custody of an accused while arrangements were made
for his future welfare-in terms of employment, guidance and super-
vision-when he had no home and no one to care for him."
B. The Defense of Mental Disorder
The common law jurisdictions of Africa are haunted by the
ghost of Daniel M'Naghten. They, or the British Colonial Office before
them, have put the M'Naghten rules-more or less-into statutory
form in their criminal codes. Even where it has been less rather than
more, the English-trained, M'Naghten-oriented judges have often
slipped into the familiar habit of reading the codes as if they simply
restated English law.5" At various times the M'Naghten formulation
55 State v. Maxamba, [1964] 1 So. Afr. L.R. 645. Section 28 of the Mental
Disorders Act, Act No. 38 of 1916 (So. Afr.), the machinery of which is incorporated
into § 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1955, refers to committal to "a gaol or
institution." See also the English legislation, note 51 supra.
56E.g., Nigerian Criminal Procedure Act, §§225-35 (1963) (in force in the
southern areas of the country) ; NORTHERN NIGERIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE § 261
(1963) ; LAWs OF SIERRA LEONE c. 39, §§ 64-69 (1960) ; see Zaria Native Authority
v. Bakori, [1964] No. Nig. L.R. 25.
57 Leseroi v. Regina, [1964] E. Afr. L.R. 111 (1963) (Kenya); Regina v. Tselize,
[1956] Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 232 (Nyas.); Malawi Criminal Procedure Act, § 167
(1951) ; LAws OF UGANDA c. 24, § 167 (1951) ; LAws OF ZANZIBAR c. 14, § 161 (1961).
5SRegina v. Tselize, supra note 57.
69 The familiar habit is too common to be documented. Recent illustrations of
its effect in African criminal statutory interpretation are given in OKONxWO & NAYsH,
CRIMINAL LAW IN NIGERIA 72-95 (1964) (nens rea); Naish, A Redefinition of
Provocation Under the Criminal Code, 1 NIG. L.J. 10 (1964) (provocation); Seidman,
Intent and the Law of Murder, 1 U. GHANA L.J. 73 (1964) (inens rea); Seidman,
Witch-Murder and Mens Rea: A Problem of Society Under Radical Social Change,
28 MODERN L. REv. 46 (1963) (ntens rea).
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has been read into statutes in which it never actually appeared,'0 it has
been used to give a gratuitous display of the bench's comparative
knowledge " and it still lingers in the minds of some lower court
judges (who are fortunately now being more regularly reversed) as
a standard of decision preferable to the statutory formulae actually in
force.62
In fact the MWNaghten rules appear in their original pristine in-
adequacy in only one African country, Sierra Leone, which has adopted
English criminal law in a piecemeal, uncodified form.3 Elsewhere,
the several different presentations of the original rules fall simply into
the categories of those which have taken approximately the M'Naghten
tests and those which have modified them.
Before dealing with these, however, we may conveniently discuss
the preliminary question of how far the actual description of mental
disorder itself has been modified in the African codes. The M'Naghten
rules themselves spoke in terms of a "defect of reason" caused by
"disease of the mind" as the mental condition on which the defense
was to be based. The principal hazard in this terminology was its
vagueness and the resulting uncertainty about the place of sub-
normality, neurosis, psychopathy, neurological disorders and other
organic disorders of the brain under the rules. Over a century of
amplification in the English courts led to the inclusion of subnormality
within the defense as a matter of practice,6 the inclusion of neuro-
logical and other organic conditions as a matter of law 5 and the
probable exclusion of neurosis and psychopathy.66
Even before these developments had crystallized, the British
government had become sufficiently aware of the deficiencies of the
M'Naghten formulation to make some changes in the codes given to
the Empire. The Indian Penal Code, the original draft of which
60E.g., Rex v. Ross, 14 Kenya L.R. 148 (1932); Nyinge s/o Suwatu v.
Regina, [1959] E. Afr. L.R. 974 (Kenya); Rex v. Bargutwa, 6 Ct. App. E. Afr. 142
(Kenya 1939) ; Rex v. Gerevasi s/o Lutabingwva, 9 Ct. App. E. Afr. 56 (Tang. 1942).
61Rex v. Omoni, 12 Sel. Judg. Ct. App. W. Afr. 511 (Nig. 1949); Rex v.
Nasamu, 6 Sel. Judg. Ct. App. W. Afr. 74 (Nig. 1940); Sudan Gov't v. Ishag,
[1958] Sudan L.JR. 1.
6 2 E.g., Regina v. Frafra, [1959] Ghana L.R. 442; Regina v. Tembo, [1961]
Rihod. & Nyas. L.R. 858 (No. Rihod.).
6 3 ELIAS, GHANA AND SIERRA LEONE 304 (1962).
64RoYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-53 REPORT 119 (1963).
651d. at 132-35 (epilepsy); Bratty v. Attorney Gen., [1963] A.C. 386 (psycho-
motor epilepsy) ; Regina v. Kemp, [1957] 1 Q.B. 399 (cerebral arteriosclerosis).
66 E.g., ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, op. cit. supra note 64, at
73-74 (definition of "mental disease") ; id. at 135-40 (psychopathy). In Attorney Gen. v.
Gallagher, [1963] A.C. 349, however, at least two of the Lords of Appeal appear to
have contemplated the possibility that a psychopathic condition could come within
the scope of the M'Naghten defense.
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in fact antedated MWNaghten, 7 provided the all-inclusive phrase "un-
soundness of mind" " which was later adopted by Northern Nigeria; 6
it is rivalled in completeness only by the Sudanese "permanent or
temporary insanity or mental infirmity." 0 Slightly less compre-
hensive is Southern Nigeria's "state of mental disease or natural mental
infirmity," "' and more explicit-but probably for that very reason
unsatisfactory-are Ghana's "idiocy, imbecility, or any mental de-
rangement or disease affecting the mind" 12 and Liberia's "idiot,
imbecile, lunatic, or insane person." " The latter two presumably
limit the defense to the low-grade defectives specified and exclude by
omission the higher-grade defectives who might otherwise take
advantage of it.
The East and Central African codes, together with the Roman-
Dutch laws of Southern Africa, have retained the "disease" concept.
The Colonial Office used as its East and Central African model the
English draft code of 1879, in which Sir James Stephen had formalized
the M'Naghten rules. 4 The only easing of the confusion about the
significance of "disease" has come through the decision of the Eastern
African Court of Appeal according subnormality the legal, if not the
6 7 The draft was originally submitted in 1837 and then underwent revision before
being put before the Legislative Council and passed in 1860. RANCHODDAS & THAKORE,
THE LAW OF CRIMES 1 (19th ed. 1956).
68 INDIAN PENAL CODE § 84.
69 NORTHERN NIGERIA PENAL CODE § 51 (1959).
70 SUDAN PENAL CODE § 50 (1925).
73 SOUTHERN NIGERIA CRIMINAL CODE § 28. "Natural mental infirmity" refers
to subnormality. Rex v. Omoni, 12 Sel. Judg. Ct. App. W. Afr. 511 (Nig. 1949);
The Queen v. Tabigen, 5 Fed. Sup. Ct 8 (Nig. 1960).
"72 GHANA CRIMINAL CODE § 27 (1960). At the time the Code was first promul-
gated in 1892 the only official English categorization of mental defectives was that
into "idiots" and "imbeciles" by the Idiots Act, 1886. Within a few years, a Royal
Commission undertook the first full inquiry into mental deficiency and its manage-
ment, and the 1913 English legislation recognized four categories of defectives-idiots,
imbeciles, feeble-minded and moral defectives. Although the original intention in
1892 may have been for the Ghanaian provision to cover all classes of defectives, by
the time the code was reenacted in 1960, it is clear that its terminology did not.
73 LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS c. 27, § 15 (1956). With the exception of one
sentence, this was based on the New York provision (now N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1120).
The New York history appears to resemble that given for England in note 72 sup ra.
In the early nineteenth century (at the time the Liberian law was being developed),
"idiocy" was recognized by the New York courts as a distinct classification and
"imbecility" was a blanket term covering all other weakness of intellect. See, e.g.,
Blanchard v. Nestle, 3 Denio 37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1846); Stewart's Executor v.
Lispenard, 26 Wend. 253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1841); Odell v. Buck, 21 Wend. 141 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1839). By the beginning of this century, it was recognized that there were
mental defectives who were not "imbeciles" and who could therefore not have the
benefit of the defense under the Penal Law. See, e.g., People v. Moran, 249 N.Y.
179, 103 N.E. 553 (1928); People v. Farmer, 194 N.Y. 251, 87 N.E. 457 (1909).
Following the adoption of mental deficiency legislation, the courts recognized at least
three categories of defectives-idiots, imbeciles and morons. People v. Hoffman, 255
App. Div. 404, 8 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1938).
74 See also STEPHEN, CRIMINAL LAW 20-22 (6th ed. 1904); 2 STEPHEN, A
HSToRy or THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 149 (1883).
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medical or logical, status of a disease for these purposes.75 South
Africa has adopted the conceptions of what its leading criminal law
textbook calls "disease of the mind or mental defect,'"' although the
same authority states categorically:
For legal purposes no distinction is to be drawn between
idiocy, lunacy, mania, paranoia, melancholia, hypochondria,
dementia, or any other species into which the various forms
of mental aberration or defect may be classified by medical
scientists . ...
The Appellate Division has at least denied to a psychopathic condition
the status of a mental disorder. 71 Organic conditions have been in-
cluded within the scope of a defense.7
The adoption of the English draft code in the East and Central
African jurisdictions has resulted, too, in the enactment of another
of Sir James Stephen's emendations. Aware of the controversies
which had surrounded the M'Naghten rules as to whether the judges
were trying in 1843 to define insanity as a whole or merely to define
that area of mental illness which would exculpate from crime, he
stated his interpretation for the avoidance of further doubt. Ap-
pended to each statement of the responsibility rule, therefore, is the
following:
But a person may be criminally responsible for an act or
omission, although his mind is affected by disease, if such
disease does not in fact produce upon his mind one or other
of the above effects mentioned [i.e., ignorance of what he is
doing or of the wrongness of what he is doing] in reference
to that act or omission.80
1. Approximate M'Naghten
The original M'Naghten rules were expressed as five questions.
They posed two separate responsibility tests: the cognitive tests appli-
cable in the case of a person who sets up the defense of insanity when
suffering from a disease of the mind ("insane delusion respecting
one or more particular subjects or persons" in the language of the
original question) and a distinct test for a person suffering only from
75 Oyee s/o Duru v. Regina, [1959] E. Afr. L.R. 407 (Uganda).
761 GAIN)IER & LANSDOWNE, op. cit. supra note 53, at 87.
77Id. at 89.
78 Rex v. Kennedy, [1951] 4 So. Air. L.R. 431.
79 E.g., Rex v. Anderson, [1928] So. Afr. L.R., C.P.D. 195 (encephalitis
lethargica).
80 E.g., KENYA PENAL CODE § 13; UGANDA PENAL CODE § 12; ZA1 - a PENAL
CODE § 13; LAWS OF ZANZiBAR c. 13, § 12(2) (1961).
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a "partial delusion" ("an insane delusion as to existing facts"). Fol-
lowing the Stephen formulation, eight countries have adopted the
cognitive tests as their only basis for decision. Eleven others have
incorporated them into their statutory schemes in some form or
other, though not as the exclusive criteria. Only Ghana"' and the
Sudan8 2 have modified them by leaving out all reference to the
accused's knowledge of the wrongfulness of the actions.
Hence, no reference to delusions appears in the legislation of
eight countries, primarily those of East and Central Africa. The
cognitive tests are expressed in these terms:
A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission
if at the time of doing the act or making the omission he is
through any disease affecting his mind incapable of under-
standing what he is doing, or of knowing that he ought not
to do this act or make this omission.'
The question to be asked for survey purposes is how far the absence
of provisions incorporating the delusion test narrows the defense. One
must assume that an interpretation which reads the delusion test into
the legislation when it has been omitted is not legitimate.84
Stephen certainly did not think that by leaving out all reference
to partial delusions he was narrowing the defense. Unlike the great
majority of his contemporaries on the English bench, he was not
content with the idea that a man could be free from mental disorder
and yet still suffer delusions limited to particular matters., His own
opinion was that delusions were relevant to the issue of mental illness
not merely with respect to the content of the delusion,"6 but either as
evidence of the illness or as evidence that the accused's cognitive
faculties were impaired."
81 GHANA CRIMINAL CODE § 27 (1960). The offender will be excused if he
either does not know the nature or consequences of the act or is so deluded as to
make him an unfit subject for punishment. Seidman, Insanity as a Defence Under
the Criminal Code, 1 U. GHANA L.J. 42, 46-47 (1964) suggests that the use of the
word "consequences" in the test has the effect of bringing into issue the defendant's
capacity to control his conduct. It is hard to agree; the scope of the cognitive test
is admittedly expanded but still remains at no more than a cognitive level.
82 SUDAN PENAL CODE § 50 (1925). The offender will be excused if he does
not possess the power to appreciate the nature of his acts or to control them.
83 See statutes collected at note 80 supra.
84For examples of this construction, see Rex v. Bargutwa, 6 Ct. App. E. Afr.
142 (Kenya 1939); Rex v. Gerevasi s/o Lutabingwa, 9 Ct App. E. Afr. 56 (Tang.
1942).
852 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 160-65 (1883).
86Under the M'Naghten formulation the accused "would be considered in the
same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion
exists were real."
872 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 85, at 160-65.
PSYCHIATRY AND CRIME IN AFRICA
Today, whenever there is any expert testimony available, it seems
unlikely that the courts will resort to the partial delusion test even
where it is present in the legislation. In Nigeria, for example, where
it is specifically included in the Criminal Code, insanity defenses will
commonly be based on the cognitive tests where the facts indicate
paranoia or other delusion." And under the Stephen-inspired codes
it has been held to be perfectly appropriate for a deluded person to be
dealt with under the cognitive tests.89
2. M'Naghten Modified
Of the three principal modifications which have been made in the
M'Naghten formula in Africa, the first is basic to the scope of the
cognitive tests.
Although the original rules suggested that inability to know
either the unlawfulness or the general wrongfulness of the action would
support the defense, the modem English interpretation is in the direc-
tion of allowing a finding of irresponsibility only if the accused does
not know that his act is unlawful." In reliance on the modern English
authority and overlooking East African authority in favor of the older
view, 1 the East and Central African courts have held the same,'2
despite the intention of the original draftsman to keep the broader
interpretation.
3
Only South Africa appears to have kept the broader interpretation
as a result of judicial decision," but Northern Nigeria has again fol-
lowed the Indian model and granted the exemption to one who is
"incapable of knowing . . . that he is doing what is either wrong
or contrary to law." 9' To say, though, that the defense is broadened
is to use a very relative term. Since we are dealing here with a minute
percentage of those who are mentally abnormal any broadening of the
rule which is expressed only in terms of cognition will extend it only
88 See, e.g., Echem v. The Queen, 14 Ct. App. W. Afr. 158 (Nig. 1952) ; Rex v.
Omoni, 12 Sel. Judg. Ct. App. W. Afr. 511 (Nig. 1949); Rex v. Inyang, 12 Ct. App.
W. Afr. 5 (Nig. 1946).
89 See, e.g., Regina v. Tembo, [1961] Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 858 (No. Rhod.);
Regina v. Magata s/o Kachehakana, [1957] E. Afr. L.R. 330 (Uganda).90 Rex v. Codere, 12 Crim. App. R. 21 (1916) ; Regina v. Windle, [1952] 2 Q.B.
826. The pre- and post-M'Naghteiz authorities adopting the broader view are reviewed
in Stapleton v. The Queen, 86 Commw. L.R. 358 (1952), in which the High Court
of Australia refused to follow the Windle decision. See also Morris, "Wrong" in
the McNaughten Rules, 16 MoDERN L. Rv. 433 (1953).
91 See, e.g., Rex v. Kamau s/o Njeroge, 6 Ct App. E. Afr. 133 (Kenya 1939).
9 2 Muswi s/o Musele v. Regina, 23 Ct. App. E. Afr. 622 (Kenya 1956) ; Golowa
v. Regina, [1964] Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 17 (No. Rhod.).
93 2 S=HEN, op. cit. supra note 85, at 167.
94 1 GAREixm & LANSDOWNE, op. cit. supra note 53, at 90.
05 NORTHERN NiGmA PENAL CODE § 51 (1959).
M1]
1152 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.114:1134
slightly. Nonetheless, it is clear that some fact situations will fall
within the defense which would not be allowed to form the basis of
the narrower defense. In Muswi s/o Musele v. Regina,"8 for example,
the accused killed his wife believing that she was bewitching him,
knowing that it was illegal to do so but being confused as to the
morality of the act. The East African Court of Appeal held that on
these facts the accused did not satisfy the narrower formulation of the
test, but it seems fairly clear that his confusion as to the rightness or
wrongness of what he was doing would afford him a defense had
he been tried in Northern Nigeria or South Africa.
The second modification, copied from West Indian codes, is in
Africa peculiar to Ghana. As we have seen, Ghana has adopted a
description of mental disorder which is full in some respects but
perilously limited in respect of subnormal conditions, and has aban-
doned the knowledge of wrongfulness as a criterion for decision. It
has taken further its policy of broadening the defense by adding as an
apparently complete alternative a test based on functional appreciation
of the significance of delusions. The defense of insanity will be avail-
able to an accused person
if he did the act in respect of which he is accused under the
influence of an insane delusion of such a nature as to render
him, in the opinion of the jury or of the court, an unfit
subject for punishment of any kind in respect of such an
act.
9 7
This appears to mean that where the accused's mental condition
makes punishment futile-presumably because he cannot be deterred
and because he would not have committed the act if he had not been
deluded-he should be exempted from it. This interpretation, sug-
gested in an editorial note in the West African Law Reports in 1957,"8
was later adopted by the Ghana Court of Appeal in 1959." It was
reversed in 1960 in favor of a M'Naghten-inclined interpretation that
the delusion should be such that if the imagined facts were true, they
would provide justification for the action taken."°
This interpretation is clearly possible. The judge or jury are
given a discretion to exempt whomsoever they feel is unfit to be
punished and are entitled to set up guidelines for the exercise of their
discretion. At the same time, bearing in mind that the guidelines
9623 Ct App. E. Afr. 622 (Kenya 1956).
9 7 GHANA CRIMINAL CODE § 27(2) (1960).
9 8 Regina v. Grumah, [1957] 2 W. Afr. L.R. 255 (Ghana 1957). The question
of interpretation was not raised at all in the actual report.
99 Regina v. Moshie, [1959] Ghana L.R. 343.
10 Degarti v. Regina, [1960] July-Dec. Cycl. Judg. Crim. 120 (Ghana).
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chosen are those of the M'Naghten formulation, it would appear a
little strange that if they were intended they were not specified as
such in the legislation. A later Court of Appeal has now held that
the broad phrasing of the section is intended to confer a broad dis-
cretion which is to be exercised not in terms of the nature of the
delusion but in accordance with the judge's or jury's assessment of
the seriousness of the accused's illness.
101
Finally, half a dozen countries have taken the first conservative
step toward undermining the hold of M'Naghten on African criminal
law. South Africa and the neighboring countries of southern Africa 02
have recognized the "dangerous doctrine" of irresistible impulse as an
overlay upon the M'Naghten rules, despite the persistent opposition to
the extension by the English courts. 03 Nigeria and the Sudan ..4
have specifically legislated in favor of the offender who is deprived by
his mental illness of the capacity to control his actions, thus avoiding
the implication of sudden impulsiveness of action but still carrying the
overtones of total deprivation of will power which will be found, on an
honest view of the facts, only in a few cases. Nonetheless, although
the form of the development has been criticized in recent years, it
represented at the time of its first enactment a considerable step forward
in the handling of the mentally abnormal offender and still, in the
African context, offers greater freedom to defendants in these few
jurisdictions than is available to those in the rest of the continent.10 5
C. Evidence of Mental Disorder: the Procedural Problems
Establishing mental disorder of a sort that will bring a defendant
within the exempting provisions of the law leads to a finding of "guilty
but insane" and the placing of the accused at the disposal of the
101 Akpavey, Crim. App. No. 159/65 (Ghana 1965); Bodie, Crim. App. No.
31/63 (Ghana 1964). I am indebted to Professor R. B. Seidman of the University
of Ghana for the first citation. On the Ghana provision see generally Seidman,
sup'ra note 81.
102 Regina v. Koortz, [1953] 3 So. Afr. L.R. 303; Regina v. Hay, [1899] Sup.
Ct 290 (So. Afr.); Rex v. Sprighton, [1939] So. Rhod. L.R. 34.
103 The English courts and the Privy Council have vigorously opposed the
"dangerous doctrine" and "fantastic" "subversive" theory. Sodeman v. Rex, [1936]
2 All E.R. 1133; Rex v. Kopsch, 19 Crim. App. R. 50 (1925); Regina v. Haynes,
[1859] 1 F. & F. 666; Attorney Gen. v. Brown, [1960] A.C. 432 (Austl.). Section
2 of the Homicide Act, 1957, now effectively allows a defense in the case of most
manifestations of inability to control behavior.
104 NGmuA CamiN.x. CODE §28 (1958); SUDAN PENr.AL. CODE § 50 (1925).
105 Despite Stephen's hope that uncontrollable behavior would be covered by the
cognitive tests, see 2 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 85, at 167, the East and Central
African courts have uniformly held that it is not. Regina v. Phiri, 5 No. Rhod. L.R.
186 (1954) ; Rex v. Shekanga s/o Ndeka, 15 Ct App. E. Afr. 158 (Tang. 1948);
Rex v. Weraga s/o Wamala, 10 Ct App. E. Afr. 48 (Uganda 1943).
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state."0 6 He cannot, if his offense is capital, be executed, nor in
theory can he be made subject to the normal primitive processes of im-
prisonment. He must be detained as a mentally abnormal offender,
given periodic medical examination 107 and considered for release only
when it is certified that he is no longer suffering from disorder, though
even then discharge will not follow automatically.' In ideal circum-
stances, he would always be detained for treatment in a mental hos-
pital; in reality, as we have seen, he may receive considerably less
than ideal treatment.
Whatever the state's interest in bringing penal consequences to
bear only on the responsible and securing treatment only for those
deemed to need it, we are here considering, in adversary terms, a
defense to a criminal charge. In the ordinary course of events, counsel
for the accused will determine whether or not the defense should be
raised at all-and with the prospect of indeterminate detention follow-
ing a successful defense, it normally will be raised only to avoid the
possibility of the death penalty-and will introduce testimony to sub-
stantiate it. Indeed, since there is in each jurisdiction only one
codified defense based on mental disorder, unlike England, for example,
where defenses based on M'Naghten and "diminished responsibility"
are alternatives in murder cases and the prosecution may rebut either
defense by producing evidence that the accused is within the other,' 8
the courts incline to the view that only the accused can properly
produce evidence of disorder."' To hold otherwise, it is said, would
106 See, e.g., LAWS OF BECHUANALAND C. 18, § 169(2) (1959) ; GHANA CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CODE §§ 137(2), (3) (1960) ; KENYA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE § 166(1)
(1951); Mental Disorders Act, Act No. 38 of 1916, § 29 (So. Afr.); LAWS OF
UGANDA c. 24, § 166(1) (1951) ; LAWS OF ZANZIBAR C. 154, §§ 160(1), (2) (1961).
Nigeria uses the terminology of "acquittal" on the ground of mental disorder, but
there is still a mandatory committal if the court finds that the accused actually did
the act alleged. Nigeria Criminal Procedure Act, §§ 229-30 (1963); NORTHERN
NIGERIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE §§ 326-27 (1963).
107 South Africa's Mental Disorders Act, Act No. 38 of 1916, §§ 25, 38, has the
most complete obligatory report procedure, requiring annual reports during the first
three years and reports in the fifth and every succeeding fifth year. Kenya and
Uganda call for a report on mental condition to be made to the executive three years
after committal and every two years thereafter. KENYA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
§ 166(2) (1951); LAWS OF UGANDA C. 24, § 166(2) (1951). The Nigerian codes
require medical officers to report whenever requested by the executive. Nigeria
Criminal Procedure Act, § 231 (1963); NORTHERN NIGERIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CODE § 328 (1963).
108 The discharge procedures are usually the same as those following the recovery
of a person originally found unfit to make his defense. See pp. 1144-46 supra. In
some jurisdictions, the judicial authority may impose limitations on release at the
time of original committal. See, e.g., Sudan Gov't v. Hamad, [1961] Sudan L.J.R.
232 (no release without reference back to the court).
109 Bratty v. Attorney Gen., [1961] 3 All E.R. 523 (Lord Denning); Regina v.
Nott, 43 Crim. App. R. 8 (1960); Regina v. Bastian, [1958] 1 All E.R. 568. Contra,
Regina v. Price, [1962] 3 All E.R. 957. The practice is now approved by the Criminal
Procedure (Insanity) Act, 1964, 12 & 13 Eliz. 2, c. 84, § 6.
110 Republic v. Mandi s/o Ngoda, [1963] E. Afr. L.R. 153 (Tang.).
PSYCHIATRY AND CRIME IN AFRICA
be to produce the result that no party to the proceedings would be
asking for a verdict of guilty, since either both prosecution and defense
would concur in seeking a verdict of insanity, or the prosecution alone
would seek it and the defense would ask for acquittal.""
This puristic view of the assigned roles in adversary proceedings
seems to be both unnecessarily dogmatic and out of tune with the
actual conditions of Africa. Of greater significance are the cases
which have faced up to the problems of the shortage of expert psychi-
atric testimony, the unlikelihood that the defense would have access to
a psychiatrist who is not a government-employed medical officer and
the illiteracy and unsophistication of many defendants.
It has already been noted that in every jurisdiction, at least in a
murder case, there is a good chance that psychiatric evidence will be
made available. In many cases, if there is any reason to suspect that
the accused is not mentally normal, he will be examined by a psychi-
atrist while in prison awaiting trial-but at the instance of the state
rather than of the accused or his advisers.112 It seems to be established
practice in most countries, following the English pattern, for the
prosecution to provide the defense with a copy of the psychiatrist's or
prison doctor's statement on the subject, and make him available as a
witness to the defense if necessary." 3 This is clearly an essential prac-
tice to insure fairness where the majority, if not all, of the medical
practitioners are government employees.
Whether the defendant in a capital case is legally represented
depends upon the state of the legal profession, the practice of assigning
counsel to indigent defendants and the nature of the court. There
may not be an adequate number of lawyers to insure representation in
all cases, the courts may not be in a position to assign counsel or-even
in capital cases in some jurisdictions-the trial may be in a native
court in which legal representation is not allowed. If, therefore, the
uneducated defendant finds himself without representation, it is
abundantly clear that he will not be able to make the best use of any
expert testimony made available to him. If, as should then happen,
1' Although the verdict would be "guilty but insane," it has been held that this
amounts not to a guilty verdict but to an acquittal. Felstead v. Rex, [1914] A.C. 534.
112 See, e.g., Northern Nigeria Capital Cases Procedure, Part A (1960). The
procedure calls for the obtaining of information about antecedents ("with special
reference to his mental condition") by the police, id. Rule 2, and observation and
report by a medical officer while the accused is in custody awaiting trial. Id. Rules
5-11. If the accused is detained in a town which has no medical officer, he must be
transferred to one which has. Id. Rule 12. In Kenya, in addition to other investi-
gatory procedures, the magistrate must automatically inquire of the local mental
hospital whether an accused has any record there at the time of committing him for
trial on a capital charge. Circular to Magistrates, [1937] 2 Kenya L.R. 130.
13 Regina v. Emi, [1957] Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 201 (Nyas.) ; Nyinge s/o Suwatu
v. Regina, [1959] E. Afr. L.R. 974 (Kenya).
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the court undertakes to guide him in presenting his defense, a number
of alternative solutions are possible.
It could be held, as in South Africa, that the prosecution should
produce the evidence of insanity and ask for a verdict based on it,
even though the defendant objects.-' 4 Kenya cases suggest that that
country is moving in the same direction," 5 but it remains to be seen
if the Tanganyika suggestion -" that the prosecution should not do
this will have any impact in Kenya. Malawi has adopted a procedure
which appears to be the most satisfactory. The strategic decisions are
left in the hands of the court, which should explain to the accused the
implications of raising an insanity defense and allow the evidence to
be called only if he then indicates that he is willing to face the conse-
quences of a possible successful defense." 7
It is commonly accepted that when the burden of proof is on the
defense, it can be satisfied by the production of evidence which estab-
lishes the probability that the defendant was suffering from mental
disorder within the statutory formulation."' The only formal excep-
tion is in the case of Liberia which, though a common law jurisdiction,
has not inherited the English procedures following a period of colonial
rule. Section 15 of its Penal Law provides that once it has been
established that the accused has previously suffered from mental
disorder, the burden of proving that he committed the offense during
a lucid interval then passes to the prosecution. No decisions have
been reported on the questions of the burden and standard of proof
when (as posited in the last two paragraphs) the defense does not call
the evidence of mental disorder. It would be paradoxical if just
because the accused were undefended and the evidence were produced
by the prosecution, his mental condition had to be established by the
higher standard of proof normally applicable to the prosecution. There
would seem to be no reason why the standard of proof should not be
deemed attached to the issue, whichever side raises it; the defendant's
114 Rex v. Holliday, [1924] So. Afr. L.R., App. Div. 250.
"15 Nyinge s/o Suwatu v. Regina, [1959] E. Afr. L.R. 974 (Kenya); Muswi
s/o Musele v. Regina, 23 Ct. App. E. Afr. 622 (Kenya 1956). The Kenya courts
have lent support to their position here by taking the view in addition that the
prosecution must establish the accused's unfitness to stand trial if it questions it.
Kaplotwa s/o Tarino v. Regina, [1957] E. Afr. L.R. 553 (Kenya).
116 Republic v. Mandi s/o Ngoda, [1963] E. Afr. L.R. 153 (Tang.).
117 Regina v. Mandala, [1957] Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 251 (Nyas.); Regina v. Emi,
[1957] Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 201 (Nyas.).
118 Rex v. Wangara, 10 Ct. App. W. Afr. 236 (Gold Coast 1944); Rex v. Mwose
s/o Mwiba, 15 Ct App. E. Afr. 161 (Kenya 1948); Rex v. Ashigifuwo, 12 Ct. App.
W. Afr. 389 (Nig. 1948); Regina v. Yaro Bin, [1964] No. Nig. L.R. 45; Rex v.
Kachinga, 13 Ct App. E. Afr. 135 (Nyas. 1946); Rex v. Smit, [1950] 4 So. Afr.
L.R. 165; Rex v. Sprighton, [1939] So. Rhod. L.R. 34; Republic v. Kiunga, [1963]
E. Afr. L.R. 1 (Tang.); Rex v. Kabande s/o Kilugwe, 15 Ct App. E. Mr. 135
(Uganda 1948).
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insanity is to be established and whoever establishes it should only
have to establish its probability."'
D. Evidence of Mental Disorder: the Nature of the Evidence
With the shortage of psychiatric experts, it is hardly surprising
that virtually all the courts have accepted that the defense of insanity
can properly be established without expert evidence. Only in Liberia
has the Supreme Court insisted that there can be no determination of
insanity without medical evidence,' although one is compelled to
wonder how far this insistence is strictly followed in the absence of
extensive medical facilities.
Elsewhere, when medical evidence is not available, the courts or
juries have to rely on the inferences they can draw from the surround-
ing circumstances and the proved acts or admitted states of mind of
the accused. The inferences will be directed toward establishing the
two separate aspects of the defense: the existence of the mental dis-
order (however it may be legislatively described) and the accused's
knowledge, capacity to control or whatever exempting feature may
be specified.
The sophistication of courts faced with a claim of mental illness
has generally grown since the day when a trial judge could be reported
as saying that he believed after observing the prisoner in court that
he was not a mentally normal person."2 Demeanor at the trial is now
given little weight except to give visual confirmation to other evidence
of disorder."2 Yet there is still to be found the judge who confesses
that
in the absence of any evidence of treatment between the
offense and the trial when it is alleged that the accused was
insane when the offense was committed, one feels bound to
look for some explanation of the fact that at the trial the
accused is sufficiently sane to understand the nature of the
proceedings .... '
"
9 The mental disorder bringing a woman within the offense of infanticide is
deemed to give rise to a different situation from the straightfoward insanity defense.
The burden of proving normality therefore rests on the prosecution and a reasonable
doubt that the woman is abnormal will be sufficient to establish the defense. Namayaja
v. Regina, 20 Ct App. E. Afr. 204 (Uganda 1953). But query.
2 0 Carew v. Jessenah, 13 Liber. L.R. 168 (1958) ; Scott v. Liberia, 1 Liber. L.R.
430 (1904).
121See Rex v. Anuku, 6 Ct App. W. Afr. 91 (Nig. 1940).
122 Rex v. Ashigifuwo, 12 Ct. App. W. Afr. 389 (Nig. 1948) ; Regina v. Tembo,
[1961] Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 858 (No. Rhod.). The accused in Ashigifuwo said he
knew nothing about the charge or the offense; at times his answers were reasonable,
at other times they were not; throughout he was listless and apathetic.
123 Regina v. Mandala, [1957] Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 251 (Nyas.).
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Fortunately, the variable nature of mental illnesses and their frequent
episodic characteristics appear to be familiar conceptions in the minds
of most judges.2
The crucial feature here is that the courts, so often relying on
inference without medical help in assessing the significance of the
inference, are in effect deciding for themselves the symptomatology
of mental illness. That they approach this task carefully is beyond
question; the accuracy of their diagnosis is another matter.
In their favor on both of these points is the fact that the courts
have generally looked not at particular acts or aspects of the accused's
life but rather at the totality of his situation. Diagnosis is not nor-
mally to be made on the strength of one or two aberrant actions but
on the basis of an appreciation of as wide a range of factors as possible.
If an accused has had pains in his head since childhood, frequently
visited native doctors for this reason and taken their medicine, 5 laughed
maniacally, thrown his food away, gone out half dressed and babbled
meaninglessly to his relatives, a court may naturally feel that he was
not entirely normal." 6 Even a less bizarre history could justifiably
lead to the same conclusion.
The difficulties that the courts have got themselves into through
lack of expertise appear to be twofold. First, in examining a broad
range of factors which they feel may have causative significance in
mental illness, they have at times been too uncritical; second, and more
important, they have laid down legal propositions that certain
symptoms are not to be given weight. They have, for example,
accepted evidence of mental instability and behavior disorder in an
accused's relatives without any consideration of whether the type of
disorder from which he is suffering is transmissible. 27 In other cases,
of course, little critical ability may have been needed. Evidence of
delusions, for many years in the nineteenth century considered essential
to the existence of mental illness, 2 ' will almost always lead to a finding
124 See, e.g., Regina v. Grumah, [1959] Ghana L.R. 307.
2 5 Rex v. Ashigifuwo, 12 Ct. App. W. Afr. 389 (Nig. 1948) ("not expert
evidence of insanity but it is evidence of some abnormality of conduct!'). Cf. Regina
v. Yeboah, [1959] Ghana L.R. 434; Regina v. Grumah, supra note 124; Sudan Gov't
v. Dafaala, [1961] Sudan L.J.R. 32.
126 These were the characteristics adduced in evidence in Rex v. Inyang, 12 Ct.
App. W. Afr. 5 (Nig. 1946).
12 7tbid. This kind of evidence appears to have been given little weight in
England. See Rex v. Smith, 5 Crim. App. R. 123 (1910); Prrr-LEwIs, SmrrH &
HAWxE, THE INSANE AND THE LAW 34, 232 (1895).
2 8 .All the questions framed in the M'Naghten case were, of course, expressed
in terms of total and partial delusions. For nineteenth century authorities which
treated delusions as sine qua non, see Regina v. Townley, [1863] F. & F. 839 (Martin,
B.) ; Regina v. Barton, 3 Cox Crim. Cas. 275 (1848) (Parke, B.). The early stress
on delusions in Anglo-American psychiatry is emphasized in DAIN, CONCEPTS OF
INSANITY IN THE-UNITED STATES, 1789-1865, 6 (1964).
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of disorder. An accused's description of paranoid beliefs-that
strangers went to his house to steal his wife or commit adultery with
her,"2 surrounding him with guns, machetes and sticks and trying to
kill him, 3' or abusing him and calling him names,' 3 ' is testimony that
the nonmedical mind can readily appreciate.
The findings of law which exclude or deny significance to facts
capable of amounting to symptoms of mental illness, however, repre-
sent the less informed side of the nonmedical mind. The courts' treat-
ment of belief in witchcraft and supernatural powers is a good
illustration. Just as in other fields they have discounted such beliefs
and refused to allow them to affect the issue of responsibility for crime
although they may have crucially altered an accused's perception of
what he was doing, 32 so in this field they have generally disregarded
them as factors associated with mental illness.' 33 Only one reported
case can be found to have given weight to them; the trial judge in
Regina v. Magata slo Kachehakana, expressed the opinion
that an African living far away in the bush may become so
obsessed with the idea that he is being bewitched that the
balance of his mind may be disturbed to such an extent that
it may be described as disease of the mind. 34
Magata had murdered his father, believing him to be Satan and to
have bewitched Magata's family. One wife, two sons and some goats
had died; another wife, the accused himself and his cow were sick-
all, the accused alleged, as a result of the deceased's activities. It is
clear that this is a particularly delicate area in which the greatest care
M
2 Rex v. Inyang, 12 Ct. App. W. Afr. 5 (Nig. 1946).
'3 0 Nyinge s/o Suwatu v. Regina, [1959] E. Air. L.R. 974 (Kenya); Echem v.
The Queen, 14 Ct. App. W. Afr. 158 (Nig. 1952); Sudan Gov't v. Dafaala, [1961]
Sudan L.J.R. 32.
'31 Sudan Gov't v. Ishag, [1958] Sudan L.J.R. 1.
132 For example, self-defense based on a supposed attack by witchcraft has com-
monly been rejected. Konkomba v. The Queen, 14 Ct. App. W. Afr. 236 (Gold
Coast 1952) ; Gadam v. The Queen, 14 Ct. App. W. Afr. 442 (Nig. 1954) ; Attorney
Gen. v. Jackson, [1957] Rhod. & Nyas. 443 (Nyas.). Such a belief, however, has
been taken into consideration in East Africa in determining whether provocation
existed in law. See, e.g., Rex v. Akope, 14 Ct. App. E. Afr. 105 (Kenya 1947);
Rex v. Kajuna s/o Mbake, 12 Ct App. E. Air. 104 (Tang. 1945); Rex v. Fabiano,
8 Ct App. E. Afr. 96 (Uganda 1941). The accused's belief that he was killing a
spirit and not a human being has been held to exculpate in some jurisdictions, e.g.,
Sudan Gov't v. Nur, [1959] Sudan L.J.R. 1, but not in others. E.g., Rex v. Mbombela,
[1933] So. Afr. L.R., App. Div. 269. The authorities are critically reviewed in
Seidman, Witch-Murder and Mens Rea: A Problem of Society Under Radical Social
Change, 28 MoDERN L. REv. 46 (1963).
133 E.g., Muswi s/o Musele v. Regina, 23 Ct App. E. Air. 622 (Kenya 1956);
The Queen v. Tabigen, 5 Fed. Sup. Ct. 8 (Nig. 1960); Rex v. Radebe, [1915] So.
Afr. L.R., App. Div. 96; Rex v. Molehane, [1942] So. Afr. L.R., G.W.L.D. 64.
M24 [1957] E. Air. L.R. 330, 331 (Uganda).
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must be taken. Belief in the immediacy of supernatural activity is
widespread and is not statistically abnormal. Modern psychiatric
studies suggest, however, that morbid fear of bewitchment and its
consequences is closely associated with acute anxiety states, either as
a cause or as a manifestation of the conditions. 35 Although differ-
entiation of pathological from culturally normal beliefs in witchcraft and
the supernatural may itself be exceedingly difficult even for the psychi-
atrist,1"' it is unfortunate that the courts should put themselves in the
position of flatly rejecting the beliefs without further inquiry.
Similarly, lack of apparent motive for committing a brutal murder
has been stigmatized by some courts as an unreliable guide to mental
disorder, though psychiatrically it may be considered of some impor-
tance. 3 7  The Zambian court in Regina v. Tembo 138 agreed that a
savage, apparently motiveless killing could be consistent with mental
illness but suggested that it might also show
the mere indulgence of a savage but reasoning instinct . . .
a brutal but perfectly sane desire to cause bloodshed . . . a
foolish and reckless, but still not insane craving for notori-
ety-and . . . possibly one or more or several other rational
and culpable states of mind.
One legal writer has cautioned, too, that when dealing with the mental
condition of "persons who, for no apparent reason, run about making
violent attacks upon everyone they meet," one should bear in mind
"that cruelty is a natural human instinct." 139
In West Africa, the courts have taken a less rigid view. Although
they have held that motiveless behavior cannot by itself be used to
support a finding of insanity, it may nonetheless give secondary sup-
135 See, e.g., FIELD, THE SEARCH FOR SECUIrry passim (1960) ; Lambo, The Role
of Cultural Factors in Paranoid Psychosis Among the Yoruba Tribe, 101 J. Ment.
Sci. 239, 247 (1955). The Cornell-Aro Study found a high correlation between belief
in supernatural forces and mental disorder. Their tabulation below relates beliefs
to mental disorder along a scale on which A indicates positive disorder and D nor-
mality:
Beliefs in A B C D
Witches 55% 46% 26% 5%
Juju 25% 19% 12% 2%
Supernatural forces 14% 10% 2% 2%
Spirits 38% 12% 11% 2%
N = 56 48 92 66
LEIGHTON, LAMBO & OTHERS, PsYcHiATRIc DISORDER AMONG THE YORUBA 146-47
(1963).
136 E.g., Lambo, supra note 135, at 247.
137 See, e.g., WHITLocK, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS 27-28
(1963).
13s Regina v. Tembo, [1961] Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 858 (No. Rhod.).
139 GLEDHILL, THE PENAL CODES OF NORTHERN NIGERIA AND THE SUDAN 92
(1963).
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port to make evidence of another sort more convincing.'4 It is there-
fore particularly easy to use this inference where the accused has
committed offenses against near and beloved relatives 141 or has simply
behaved in a wild and uncontrolled manner.-1- It is difficult to think
of any other verdict than one of irresponsibility when, for example,
a man wanders into a completely strange village, sets fire to a hut,
stabs an old man who tries to put the fire out, attacks and kills another
man with a spear and a knife, sets fire to two more huts and finally
wounds at least two other men before he is overpowered.143
It is in these cases of running amok that the courts can most
easily operate within the framework of the cognitive and control tests.
They can infer with confidence from the accused's behavior-whether
he actually tells them so or not-that he did not know what he was
doing. It is where the disorder takes a less dramatic and frenetic
form that the determination of his capacity for knowledge or control
will be more troublesome. The accused's own description of his state
of mind may or may not be helpful and may or may not be believed.
And the facts from which inference can be drawn may be ambiguous-
such as the accused's running away from the crowd at the scene of
the crime, washing the murder weapon and apologizing for his be-
havior 4 or immediately admitting the murder and surrendering to
the police "to be killed." 14' Clearly even such an apparently un-
ambiguous set of circumstances as buying a knife and stabbing a man
14o Rex v. Ashigifuwo, 12 Ct App. W. Afr. 389 (Nig. 1948); Rex v. Inyang,
12 Ct App. W. Afr. 5 (Nig. 1946); Regina v. Yayiye, [1957] No. Nig. L.R. 207;
Salako v. Attorney Gen., [1965] Nig. Monthly L.R. 107 (W. Nig.).
141 See, e.g., Regina v. Yeboah, [1959] Ghana L.R. 434 (mother); Muswi s/o
Musele v. Regina, 23 Ct. App. E. Afr. 622 (Kenya 1956) (wife); Echem v. The
Queen, 14 Ct. App. W. Afr. 158 (Nig. 1952) (friend); Rex v. Ashigifuwo, mupra
note 140 (woman "like a mother to him"); Sudan Gov't v. Mohamed, [1961] Sudan
L.J.R. 199 (husband); Regina v. Magata s/o Kachehakana, [1957] E. Afr. L.R. 330
(Uganda) (father). It must be remembered, however, that in Africa as elsewhere,
even in the absence of mental disorder, murder is most likely to take place within
the family group, however that may be defined. See AFRICAN HomIcm. AN Y SUICME
ch. 9 (Bohannan ed. 1960).
142 See, e.g., Regina v. Moshie, [1959] Ghana L.R. 343; Regina v. Grumah,
[1959] Ghana L.R. 307; Regina v. Yayiye, [1957] No. Nig. L.R. 207; Sudan Gov't
v. Dafaala, [1961] Sudan L.J.R. 32.
143 Sudan Gov't v. Ishag, [1958] Sudan L.J.R. 1.
144 Echem v. The Queen, 14 Ct. App. W. Afr. 158 (Nig. 1952). Echem was
clearly schizophrenic with paranoid delusions.
145 Nyinge s/o Suwatu v. Regina, [1959] E. Afr. L.R. 974 (Kenya). Nyinge
was held to be outside the M'Naghten defense on the ground that his immediate
surrender and confession to the police established that he knew, at the time he killed,
that he was doing wrong. But see WHrrLocK, op. cit. spra note 137, at 87:
It is in the setting of flatness or incongruity of mood that a schizophrenic
patient can be overcome by an irresistible impulse to kill. . . . [I]t is not
unusual for such a crime to be followed by the minimum of attempt to cover
up its traces, or the murderer may even go to the police to confess.
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against whom the accused has a grievance may take on a different
complexion against a background of mental disorder. 46
Expert evidence on this crucial issue of cognition or control at the
time of the offense, where it is available, needs to be specific and de-
tailed. The courts are unlikely to challenge any psychiatric assertion
that an accused was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of
the offense, though since there must be a finding of fact on this issue
based on all the evidence they are entitled to do so. The divergence
from medical opinion, if there is divergence at all, comes on the issue
of cognition or control. The observations of the Chief Justice of
Malawi indicate the basis for disagreement:
In most cases the best evidence is that of those witnesses
who can speak to the accused's actions and demeanour at and
immediately before and immediately after the incident in
question, and the experts can really reach their opinions only
by inference from those facts supported by their expert
knowledge of the subject and a somewhat belated examination
of the accused. It is no wonder, therefore, that juries some-
times think that they can form just as good an opinion from
the evidence as can an expert who has never seen the accused
until some time after the moment at which he is alleged to
have been insane.14
Without wishing to disagree with the Chief Justice's appreciation
of the attitude of juries (which one feels can justifiably be extended
to include many judges), much will surely turn on the psychiatrist's
"expert knowledge." It is this knowledge which allows the psychi-
atrist to make an educated retrospective assessment of the accused's
mental condition and state of knowledge in the light of the psychiatric
diagnosis. The court obviously should not accept as adequate proof
a categorical statement about an accused's state of mind which is un-
supported by facts and reasoning. 48 Nonetheless, by insisting too
possessively on their right (or the jury's right) to be the final arbiters
of fact, the courts often run the risk of undermining the significance
of psychiatric testimony, reducing "expert knowledge" to the status
of simple opinion, and injecting their rational appreciation of events
into an inherently irrational situation.
146 Sudan Gov't v. Sakhi, [1961] Sudan L.J.R. 110. The accused had twice been
under treatment-once apparently suffering from a remarkable "illness of false pre-
tence"-and was found on examination the day after the offense to be mentally
disordered. The court would not accept that the psychiatric history per se was enough
evidence on which to base the defense, and dismissed the medical testimony on the
ground that it was uncorroborated and it was "known that most crimes are the result
of temptation or impulses that are not resisted."
14'TRegina v. Mandala, [1957] Rhod. & Nyas. L.R. 251 (Nyas.).
1481d. at 253; Sudan Gov't v. Sakhi, [1961] Sudan L.J.R. 110.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The vital question is how far these tests and procedures are suited
to Africa, given the conditions and facilities of Africa. They are not
tests and procedures which were originally evolved in Africa, but ones
which have been fashioned by colonial or independent legislatures in
the image of foreign models. The Imperial government approved
them not because they were culturally sensitive but because they both
embodied familiar common law formulae and, if adopted on a broad
enough basis, could offer colonial uniformity. African governments
which have been criminal law-givers in the past few years have either
copied the legislation of other African states (Bechuanaland-Zambia,
1963), adopted well-tried overseas models (Northern Nigeria-India,
1959) or simply re-enacted their own earlier provisions (Ghana, 1892-
1960). And in Africa, as anywhere else, merely retaining a code
provision without alteration has not necessarily signified acceptance,
especially, as is true of Africa, when the new governments have been
preoccupied with the basic tasks of national development and are con-
tent to leave their legal affairs in the hands of English or English-
trained lawyers.
Are these provisions the right ones for African countries today?
When one considers the state of community knowledge of mental
illness, the nature of the indigenous forms of treatment and the general
inadequacy of modern medical facilities, one is tempted to draw a
parallel with Europe and the United States in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. The tests for the recognition of mental ill-
ness and the criteria of criminal responsibility which were adopted
were culturally viable in those times and places, whatever we may
feel today about their inadequacy.'49 Perhaps it is possible, assuming
the equation of modern Africa with Europe and the United States one
hundred fifty years ago, to make use of the methodology developed
then.
The suggestion must be firmly rejected. First, the argument can
be made on the general grounds of scientific development and of
international responsibility to assist in the spread of informed attitudes.
We should no more think of reverting to a pre-psychiatric test of
responsibility than we would of advocating a wholesale return to
bloodletting, blistering and purging as measures of treatment. Al-
though individual communities in Africa may be effectively isolated
149 1 have relied for my information about the historical appreciation of mental
illness on DAiN, op. cit. supra note 128, and K. JoNEs, LUNACY, LAW & Co0sclrEc,
1744-1845 (1955).
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from the main currents of modem medical thought, the nations of
which these communities form part are not. Their facilities may be
poor, but they are not themselves wholly unaware of this; to suggest
that they isolate themselves even further from scientific development
would be neither ethical, humane nor politically feasible.
Secondly, there is certainly nothing to suggest that the variety
of responsibility tests which were in common use in England or the
United States before the formulation of the M'Naghten rules were
capable of making a satisfactory distinction between the responsible
and the irresponsible, or even between the dangerous and the non-
dangerous. From the "wild beast" test of the Arnold case ... through
the various cognitive tests devised before the M'Naghten rules, 5 ' the
result was uniformly the same; only the manifestly disturbed were
identified. Since at the time, however, medical opinion leaned heavily
in the direction of recognizing delusion and hallucination, together with
inappropriate behavior, as the principal symptoms of any mental dis-
order worthy of the name, the artificiality of the criminal responsibility
tests simply insured the detention of the grossly disordered together
with the grossly disordered who had been civilly committed.'52
Today, we therefore say that the tests based upon an old-
fashioned pre-psychiatric view of mental illness are unsatisfactory. In
the developed, scientific-age cultures of Europe and the United States
we criticize the M'Naghten rules; they are based on a discredited view
of the compartmentalization of the human mind; they focus un-
realistically on the cognitive factor in mental disorder; they mislead-
ingly rely on the concepts of delusion and partial and total insanity;
they impede the giving of meaningful psychiatric testimony; they were
devised under conditions of political pressure and probably narrowed
the previously understood law; and they are workable only by reason
of their regular breach. The result has been that the transatlantic
jurisdictions have steadily moved away from the M'Naghten position.
Should Africa, torn between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries
in terms of its psychiatric facilities, do the same?
The preliminary answer is that some parts of Africa, as we have
seen, have done so already. There is only one carbon copy of the
14o 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724).
161 The more important authorities are collected in K. JONES, op. cit. supra note
149, Appendix 1. It should be remembered, of course, that even apart from the "wild
beast" of the Arnold case, the pre-M'Naghten tests were not uniformly cognitive. In
Regina v. Oxford, 9 Car. & P. 525, 173 Eng. Rep. 941 (1840), only three years before
M'Naghten, Lord Denman, C.J., was directing a jury that "if some contributory disease
was in truth the acting power within him which he could not resist, he would not be
responsible."
152 See DAIN, op. cit. supra note 128, at 6.
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M'Naghten rules still in force and most of the significant developments
are in the direction of expanding the responsibility tests to cover an
accused's inability to control his behavior. Nonetheless, most of the
jurisdictions retain impaired cognition and moral-legal judgment as
essential criteria in their responsibility formulations.
It is generally true, as well, that in theory a defense based on
the M'Naghten right-wrong test will be broader than it will be in
England or the United States. This is the inevitable result of the
diversity of the African communities and their differential contact
with the formal laws and community standards of their nation. There
is for any African who is not wholly integrated into a westernized
urban environment some difficulty in appreciating the state of the
laws enacted by a remote central government. With the diversity
of African and westernized cultures and the constant conflict-modifica-
tion process of social evolution, there will be similar difficulty in obtain-
ing awareness of any single moral norm with which to accord one's
behavior. When, as we have seen, it is these very facts of culture
conflict and change which are at the root of much mental disorder in
Africa, the conclusion follows that the M'Naghten defense will prob-
ably be more widely available in Africa than in any more homogeneous
culture.
But there is a stronger argument in favor of retaining the present
position: the difficulty involved in implementing a change. Psychi-
atric facilities-psychiatrists to examine, diagnose, treat and testify,
hospitals to accommodate, drugs and equipment as diagnostic aids and
for specialized therapies-are only irregularly available. Most African
countries have some facilities, few have none, none have all. Without
any question, all that exist are being put to maximal use. If the
number of patients to be diagnosed and treated were to increase with-
out any corresponding increase in the facilities, either diagnosis and
treatment would become unprofessionally meager, or the system would
break down. Neither is a palatable alternative. Yet either could be
the consequence of broadening the present responsibility tests or of
requiring pre-trial psychiatric examination on a wider footing.
If the present position does not change, on the other hand, an
unsatisfactory system will be perpetuated. Most African countries,
for example, have a mandatory death sentence for murder. The
Roman-Dutch-based laws of southern Africa and the Indian-based
code of Sudan recognize extenuating circumstances which may reduce
the sentence to one of imprisonment. The mentally disordered
murderer who does not fall within the responsibility exemption there-
fore either faces the death penalty with the prospect of possible execu-
196]
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tive clemency, or hopes for a judicial exercise of discretion in his
favor.'5 3 But he may still be executed."
Even conceding that he will not usually be executed, the result
will be that the commuted sentence--or the judicial sentence in the
case of a noncapital offense-will be served in prison. The conse-
quences of this have already been examined; 155 they are likely to be
strictly nontherapeutic and the possibilities of transfer to some more
therapeutic regime are not exactly well marked.
The practical realities of the situation are that no change will be
made in African legislation and practices in this field in the foreseeable
future. Legislatively and economically, the treatment of the mentally
ill is a long way down the list of development priorities. Change must
nonetheless be built into the fabric of social and legal attitudes so that
the implementation of more progressive policies will be less painful
when development has reached the stage of allowing it.
(1) Although legislation exists which makes possible pre-trial
medical examination of criminal defendants, more can now be done
to provide diagnostic and information-supplying services to the courts.
They are particularly deficient at the present time as a result of the
continent-wide shortage of trained probation officers. Most countries
have had legal provision for probation services for decades but the
slowness with which the provisions have been implemented has been
uniformly discouraging. Too much weight cannot be attached to the
valuable auxiliary task performed by probation officers in presenting
relevant background information to the courts and in assisting with the
work of screening defendants for mental illness. As more light is
thrown upon personality characteristics and the circumstances in which
offenses are committed, greater aid is given to the courts in deciding
upon appropriate correctional measures.
(2) Something should be done to heighten the judges' awareness
of psychiatric concepts, on a better-late-than-never basis. Although
the supply of psychiatrists is slowly increasing, it will take many years
15 Regina v. Roberts, [1957] 4 So. Afr. L.R. 265; Rex v. Lloyd, [1941] So.
Afr. L.R., C.P.D. 162; Rex v. Biyana, [1938] So. Afr. L.R., E.D.L. 310; Sudan
Gov't v. Mohamed, [1961] Sudan L.J.R. 199.
'54 See, e.g., State v. Harris, T.P.D. (So. Afr. 1965) (unreported). Harris
was executed for causing the death of an elderly white woman by the explosion of
a bomb in the concourse of the Johannesburg Railway Station. It was common
ground between the psychiatrists on both sides that Harris was emotionally unstable
and showed extensive personality immaturity (I am indebted to Mr. D. Welsh of
the University of Cape Town for this information). See also Sudan Gov't v. Wajo,
[1961] Sudan L.J.R. 114: "The accused was not insane or weak minded, but he was
emotionally unstable to an abnormal degree. In my view this should not be a reason
for commutation of the death sentence."
155 See pp. 1140-42 supra.
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before expert assistance is available in every case in which it is desir-
able. In the meantime, the judges will continue to instruct themselves,
assessors or juries, as the individual case may be, on what constitutes
mental illness. At the moment, they have only an inadequate English
legal education and their personal insights and sympathies to guide
them. The answer may be a broader based education at the new
African law schools,'56 the interchange of information between psychi-
atrists and judges or even the straightforward supplying of information
about the symptomatology of common mental illnesses.157  Amateur
diagnosis is obviously dangerous, but amateur diagnosis that is sym-
pathetic and partially informed is an improvement upon that which is
neither. In due course, professional judgment involving clinical skill
and experience would become available to supplant this makeshift
"expertise."
(3) Were change possible, the responsibility tests should be re-
modeled. Quite apart from any criticism of unreality which may be
directed against cognitive M'Naghten-type formulations, an effort
could be made to simplify the issues. What amounted to mental illness
would always have to be determined somewhat imperfectly by the indi-
vidual parts of the judge-assessors-jury trio, and no doubt this would
continue to lead to the identification of only the manifestly disturbed
offenders. The level of awareness of the latter two parts of the
trio ' might well be somewhat limited, but the hope is that with
assistance and guidance from the judge, they will be able to function
with more accuracy than at the present time.
If the basic postulate of mental illness, upon which the whole
defense is to be based, can be described in the most general terms, the
courts will be relieved of some of the embarrassment of trying to fit
psychiatric categories into legislative language. A description such as
"unsoundness of mind" would give sufficient flexibility for the courts
to fit their various conceptions of mental illness into the statutory
formula. There would inevitably be doubt about the inclusion of
some psychiatric categories within this or any other description-
256 Although most of the criminal law teaching in the new law schools is sympa-
thetic to inter-disciplinary understanding of these problems, there are to the best of
my knowledge no courses presently given which explore the problems in legal and
psychiatric depth.
157 GLEDHmL, op. cit. supra note 139, at 91, gives a summary of some of the
characteristics of major types of mental disorder, expressly on the basis of the diffi-
culties in obtaining medical evidence. It is unfortunately not expressed in a very
helpful form and is of too limited a nature to be of much practical value.
158 It is difficult to generalize about any community's awareness of mental illness.
Some evidence suggests that it may be very highly developed. See, e.g., LEIGHTON,
LAmBo & OTHERS, op. cit. supra note 135, at 113-14; Gelfand, Psychiatric Disorders
as Recognized by the Shona, in MAGIC, FAITH AND HEALING 156 (Kiev ed. 1956).
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"psychopathy" or "sociopathy" in particular will probably defy classi-
fication (or even recognition) in the absence of psychiatric assistance-
but simplification of the general terminology would make this no more
difficult a task than under existing statutory formulae.
It is tempting to suggest that some guidelines might be laid down
as matters of law to help the courts in their determination of mental
illness. Probably too many factors weigh against it. The existing
findings of law which dictate the weight to be given to particular
symptoms are good illustrations of the dangerous tendency such rules
have to exclude certain areas of testimony which could be significant.
Judgment must be exercised by the trier of fact but prejudgment may
do an injustice to the issue.
Moreover, simplification of the responsibility issue could be so
arranged as to have the effect of reducing the number of issues upon
which a psychiatrically unaided decision is needed. The determination
of the issue whether mental illness exists cannot be avoided, for it is
the sine qua non of the whole topic. But whether the morality of
African peoples, their governments or their legal advisers would require
the continuation of additional tests which call for the differentiation
of different classes of the mentally ill, whether in terms of cognition
or control, is another matter. Responsibility tests which called for
exculpation simply on the showing of cause and effect between the ill-
ness and the offense would be neither inappropriate nor impossible to
operate.'5 9 Indeed, the chances are that by reducing the issues in both
number and intricacy, they may be more manageable.
(4) Lastly, it should not be impossible to make major improve-
ments in correctional facilities without going so far as the wholesale
revamping of the system of psychiatric institutional care. It is mis-
leading to suggest, as one observer has,160 that the contribution of
psychiatry to the solution of penal problems in Africa is necessarily
measured by the presence or absence of psychiatric hospitals. Indeed,
psychiatric hospitals of the conventional type have not adapted them-
selves easily to African conditions and doubt may genuinely be cast
on how great a role they have to play in developed African penal
systems.
Secure conditions of treatment are obviously going to remain
a vital consideration in the case of some proportion of the mentally
ill who find themselves caught up in the processes of the criminal law.
159 am thinking here mainly of formulations in terms of the Durham test or
the diminished responsibility test of the English Homicide Act.
100 Clifford, The Evaluation and Methods Used for the Prevention and Treatment
of Juvenile Delinquency in Africa South of the Sahara, 21 INT"L REv. CRIM. PoT. 17,
25 (1963).
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But it must be remembered that at the present time committal to
African mental hospitals through these processes is not so much a
function of the dangerousness of the patient-defendant's condition but
of the lack of availability of other facilities. Were probation ma-
chinery to develop further, it would become feasible to make more
regular use of the insertion of psychiatric treatment conditions into
probation orders. In this way, the increasing availability of psychi-
atrists could be put to maximal use without at the same time calling
for an impossible extension of institutional facilities.
Either by using the probation device, too, or by direct committal
on a finding of irresponsibility, greater use could perhaps be made of
other forms of minimum security treatment. Mental health work
carried out in the context of Nigerian villages, for example, has demon-
strated that a therapeutically organized community can give adequate
care and minimize impairment and chronic illness. The cost has
been found to be low and community attitudes favorable and helpful. 6
And if by the extension of legal activity into these areas the emphasis
commonly placed on the link between capital charges and mental
treatment can be reduced, considerable impetus will be given to the
orderly development of further cooperation between law and psychiatry.
But for the time being, the spirit of Daniel M'Naghten lingers on.
So too does that of the witch doctor. It will probably be many years
before both are exorcised.
161 See note 7 mipra.
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